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ZONING, COMMUNES AND
EQUAL PROTECTION
Does the Constitution require municipalities to treat experimental
living groups and traditional families without distinction (i.e: to
admit communes into single-family precincts) in the application of
their zoning ordinances? This interesting and timely question was
raised in the recent California case of Palo Alto Tenants Union v.
Morgan.'
The suit involved a challenge to Palo Alto's "single-family residen-
tial" (R-l) zoning ordinance brought by a commune consisting of
more than four unrelated persons desiring to live together in an R-1
neighborhood. That ordinance defines "family" as "one person liv-
ing alone, or two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or
legal adoption, or a group not exceeding four persons living as a
single housekeeping unit."2 Plaintiffs argued that since the enactment
allows families of any size to live in R-1 areas, the provision for not
more than four unrelated persons was arbitrary, unreasonable and a
violation of plaintiffs' rights of free association and equal protection
of the laws. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of
California rejected plaintiffs' arguments and upheld the constitution-
ality of Palo Alto's ordinance. 3
The court concluded that the act was reasonably related to the
protection of public health, safety and welfare and was, therefore,
constitutionally valid and within the city's legislative competence. It
cited the likelihood that unrelated living groups will (1) have more
cars per unit than families, causing parking and traffic problems;
(2) make more noise; (3) have more wage earners per unit (with
the possibility that this would upset the neighborhood rent structure
and force traditional families out of the neighborhood); and (4)
increase the population density in residential neighborhoods. Since
the average traditional family in the United States has fewer than
four members, the city's cut-off number was not considered arbitrary.
Additionally, the city pointed out that communes were free to estab-
1. 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
2. PALO ALTO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 18.04.210, 18.88.050 (1972).
3. 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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lish themselves in other areas; thus, the court was not faced with a
situation where communes of more than four persons were com-
pletely excluded from the city. The ordinance did not prohibit
communal living as such; it merely regulated the areas where this
could be practiced.4
Moreover, the court made it clear that the state has a strong and
legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of stable family units.
Traditional families, according to the court, perform unique and
valuable social functions in raising and educating young people and
providing for the emotional and physical needs of family members.
Unrelated living groups may or may not perform the same functions
voluntarily; but, they do so only voluntarily and without the persua-
sion of law or tradition. Also, they may form and disband at will.
Therefore, a classification by the state based upon traditional family
ties is not unreasonable and does not violate the equal protection
clause.5
The general rule regarding the validity of zoning ordinances has
not changed since 1926 when it was pronounced by the Supreme
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.6: municipal zoning
ordinances are constitutional in principle as a valid exercise of the
police power of a state when they are reasonably related to the health,
safety, morals or welfare of the community.7 State enabling statutes
characteristically grant to local governments wide authority to zone
for the good of the community.8 The traditional judicial test for
zoning ordinances and zoning discriminations has been one of reason-
ableness: an act will be upheld if it is fairly debatable that it is
related to the health, safety, morals or welfare of the community.0
Provided zoning ordinances are within the scope of the enabling act,10
4. Id. at 912-13.
5. Id. at 911-12.
6. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
7. Id. at 390.
8. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65800 (Deering Supp. 1972).
9. D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON & C. MARTIN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE
494-95 (1969).
10. See, e.g., City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 I1. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116
(1966), where an ordinance defining "single-family" to exclude four unrelated
persons was held to be beyond the scope of the enabling act. There is dictum in
this case to the effect that a definition of "family" based on marriage or con-
sanguinity might not be constitutionally reasonable.
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there is a strong presumption of validity.1 Courts have been ex-
tremely reluctant to strike down such laws as arbitrary or unreason-
able unless the arbitrariness is clear.'12
In the half century since Village of Euclid, the establishment of
residential enclaves has been universally accepted as a legitimate
exercise of the police power.' 3 The classification "single-family" resi-
dential has been held reasonable and related to the police power in
the regulation of population density, traffic, noise, building sizes and
similar matters affecting the community welfare.14 Some commen-
tators have concluded that single-family zoning is the highest use to
be made of a community's land. 16
The Palo Alto ordinance is not atypical."" It is similar to the rec-
ommendation of the American Society of Planning Officials, which
defines "family" in the zoning sense to be:
[One or more persons occupying a single dwelling unit, pro-
vided that unless all members are related by blood or marriage,
no such family shall contain over five persons, but further pro-
vided that domestic servants employed on the premises may be
housed on the premises without being counted as a family or
families.17
That definition is the product of experience and drafting sophistica-
tion. The ambiguity of early statutes with regard to the meaning of
"family" opened the door for litigation by fraternities, dormitories,
large groups of in-laws and other such units.' s In the absence of
11. See, e.g., Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388 (1925),
aff'd, 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
12. Id.
13. 1 ANDERSOu, THE AM iERICAN LAW OF ZONINr §§ 8.27-28, at 635 (1968).
14. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), aff'd
mer., 273 U.S. 781 (1926). See also City of Newark v. Johnson, 70 N.J. Super.
381, 175 A.2d 500 (Essex County Ct. 1961).
15. ANDERSON, supra note 13.
16. See, e.g., ST. Louis, Mo., REv. CODE § 2201.2 (1960).
17. F. BLAIR & E. BARTLrY, TExT OF A MODERN ZONING ORDINANCE § 18, at
70 (3d ed. 1966).
18. See, e.g., Village of Riverside v. Reagan, 270 Ill. App. 355 (1933) (a
widow, her 12 children, the husbands of three daughters and three grandchildren
living in one house constituted a single family); Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg,
138 Conn. 357, 84 A.2d 687 (1951) (four different biological families occupying
one large house and sharing kitchen facilities constituted a single family within
the meaning of the local ordinance); Application of LaPorte, 2 App. Div. 2d 710,
152 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd mem., LaPorte v. City of New Rochelle,
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specific definitions, courts have construed "family" and "single-fam-
ily" in ways which are often at odds with the statutory objectives. 19
The cut-off number of unrelated persons is necessary to prevent an
equal protection challenge. One "single-family" statute which pro-
vided merely for a single housekeeping unit, without stipulating a
number of unrelated persons as constituting a family, was held to vio-
late the fourteenth amendment since it permitted any number of per-
sons to occupy a house ostensibly as a "family" and allowed division
of housekeeping expenses provided only that they live as a solitary
housekeeping unit, while the very same number of persons could not
live in one house in several housekeeping units. 20
The constitutional issues raised by zoning ordinances which exclude
non-families were considered by two New Jersey courts in Kirsch
Holding Company v. Manasquan.21 In that case a state appellate
court upheld an ordinance passed by a seacoast town to prevent
groups of unrelated persons from living together anywhere within
the municipality. The ordinance, providing that no dwelling unit
could be used or rented by a group or collection of unmarried per-
sons not qualifying as a "family," was enacted to prevent "[n]oise,
obscene and profane language, wild parties, immorality, lewd conduct,
drunkenness, parking and traffic congestion, ... destruction of the
peace and quiet."22 In response to the allegation that the ordinance
was arbitrary, unreasonable and a violaton of plaintiff's constitutional
rights, the court declared that the question must be considered with
regard to the offensive character of the conduct sought to be regu-
lated. In view of the stated purposes, the definition of "family" in the
ordinance was found to be neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. 2
2 N.Y.2d 921, 141 N.B.2d 917, 161 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1957) (60 students of
a religious order, living together as a single housekeeping unit, did constitute a
family within the meaning of the zoning ordinance).
19. Id.
20. Harmon v. City of Peoria, 373 Ill. 594, 27 N.E.2d 525 (1940).
21. 111 N.J. Super. 359, 268 A.2d 333 (Super. Ct. 1970), rev'd, 59 N.J. 241,
281 A.2d 513 (1971).
22. 111 N.J. Super. at 363, 268 A.2d at 335.
23. 59 N.J. 241, 247, 281 A.2d 513, 516 (1971). "Family" is defined as:
one or more persons related by blood or marriage occupying a dwelling unit
and living as a single, non-profit housekeeping unit [or a] collective num-
ber of individuals living together in one house under one head, whose rela-
tionship is of a permanent and distinct character, and cooking as a single
housekeeping unit. This definition shall not include any society, club, frater-
nity, sorority, association, lodge, combine, federation, group, coterie, or
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This holding was reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court.24
That court noted that the conduct of many rental groups was un-
deniably obnoxious and immoral. However, it held that since the
ordinance banned innocent and innocuous group renting as well, it
was arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the property owners'
rights of substantive due process.25 The court stated that "[z]oning
ordinances are not intended and cannot be expected to cure or pre-
vent most anti-social conduct in dwelling situations" and suggested
that effective police regulations are the appropriate way to curb
offensive behavior. -!6
The Palo Alto court, by contrast, affirmed the propriety of using
zoning ordinances to control or regulate potentially offensive behavior
-although that case can be distinguished since the Palo Alto ordi-
nance made no attempt to exclude unrelated living groups from the
municipality entirely. The court reaffirmed the presumption of
validity of zoning ordinances and the traditional judicial restraint in
declining to strike down zoning ordinances that reasonable men
might debate.27 Traditional biological families have always been
favored by zoning laws, and the propriety of excluding non-family
living units from single-family areas has been established in Ameri-
can law. The Palo Alto case supports the conclusion that this kind of
discrimination is not unreasonable, whatever the outcome might be
in a Kirsch Holding Company situation where total exclusion is the
statute's objective.
The novel question presented in the Palo Alto case was whether
the interest of a group of persons wishing to experiment with new
communal life styles is so fundamental and vital that this group
should be entitled to invoke the special test of the equal protection
clause which has been held applicable to racial, religious and political
groups, as well as to indigents in the criminal process-that any dis-
crimination must not merely be reasonable, but must be justified by
a compelling state interest. The petitioners relied upon the Supreme
organization, which is not a recognized religious order, nor include a group
of individuals whose association is temporary and resort-seasonal in char-
acter or nature.
Id.
24. 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 253-54, 281 A.2d at 520.
27. 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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Court's holding in Shapiro v. Thompson2s that the right of indigents
to move between states is fundamental and must be unimpeded by
discriminatory state welfare laws absent a showing of compelling
state interest. The petitioners in Palo Alto read Shapiro as an exten-
sion of the concept of "basic" and "fundamental" rights to include
all constitutionally protected rights, and specifically rights of free
movement, free association and privacy. 29 The Palo Alto court
refused to read Shapiro so broadly. It interpreted Shapiro as merely
adding the right of indigents to move freely from state to state to the
list of fundamental and specially protected rights.30 Therefore,
Shapiro is not applicable to the present case since it did not involve
any interests which other cases had found to be fundamental (e.g., the
interests of racial, religious and political groups) .1
The Shapiro decision has been vigorously attacked, and it is ques-
tionable whether even its narrow holding will stand unaltered. It is
highly unlikely that any lower court will construe it in its broad-
est sense without a clear mandate from an appellate court or the
Supreme Court itself.32 Were a court to find the Shapiro doctrine
applicable in such a case, and hold that an inferred right of any
group to live wherever it chooses might not be abridged without
some compelling state interest, the law of zoning would be literally
turned upside down: presumptions of validity would become pre-
sumptions of invalidity and traditional police powers of a state
would be severely circumscribed by new and vague notions of sub-
stantive equal protection.13
28. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
29. See 394 U.S. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting): "Today the list [of funda-
mental rights] apparently has been further enlarged to include classifications based
upon recent interstate movement, and perhaps those based upon the exercise of
any constitutional right."
30. 321 F. Supp. at 911.
31. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
32. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969).
33. Courts may be more willing to question the constitutionality of statutory
definitions of "family" in cases which do not involve zoning ordinances. See, e.g.,
Moreno v. USDA, 345 F. Supp. 310 (D.C. Cir. 1972), where the court held that
a provision of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (1970) de-
fining "household" to include only groups of related persons was a violation of
equal protection.
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It may be concluded that Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan
reaffirms the constitutional reasonableness of excluding non-families
from single-family neighborhoods and rejects an attempt to change
the standard of review of zoning ordinances by extending the doctrine
of substantive equal protection to communal living groups.
Jay A. Summerville
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1973/iss1/18
